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This thesis used action research to make restructuring recommendations for the 
Director of Military Operations (Code 04), Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). The 
restructuring recommendations were provided to assist Code 04 in managing Base 
Operations Support (BOS) it provides to the Presidio of Monterey (POM) and other 
activities. 
Following the closure of Fort Ord, BOS for the POM shifted from Fort Ord to NPS. 
This created some of the largest and most complex Interservice Support Agreements (ISAs) 
in DoD. Because of the size and scope of the ISAs, a much more complex organizational 
relationship exists between Code 04, the POM, and other supported commands. This 
complex organizational relationship has caused coordination problems and overloaded Code 
04. 
The criteria used to make restructuring recommendations were the cost associated with 
the restructuring and the congruence of the organization structure with its environment. 
The central recommendation is that NPS should to include an integrator function under 
Code 04 to coordinate and control the development and execution of ISAs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The environment DoD has been operating in for the last several years is one of 
shrinking budgets and reduced numbers of military installations and other assets such as 
aircraft, ships, personnel, etc. The environment has also caused the redistribution and 
consolidation of functions to better match available resources. This redistribution and/or 
consolidation of resources has caused military installations to close, reduce in size, or, in some 
instances, grow in size and/or mission. The later case, growth in mission, is the environment 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)1 is in today. With the closure of Fort Ord, NPS 
assumed the responsibility of base operations support2 (BOS) for the Presidio of Monterey 
(POM) and other commands previously supported by Fort Ord. NPS also assumed BOS for 
new commands that moved into Fort Ord buildings and facilities at Fort Ord that were not 
closed. NPS responded to its increased responsibility by expanding its work force to support 
its added mission. This thesis will look at the background which caused NPS' mission to 
increase in scope and provide alternatives for restructuring itself to better cope with its 
increased mission. 
A.        AREA OF RESEARCH & RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis looks at reorganization options for the Director of Military Operations 
(Code 04) at NPS.    (See Figures 1.1 and 1.2).    Code 04 is specifically looking for 
1
 A complete list of acronyms is provided in Appendix A. 
2
 A definition of "base operations support" is provided in Appendix B 
alternatives to better coordinate his relationship with the school's tenant commands3 and the 
newly established Interservice Support Agreements4 (ISAs) with the (POM) and the POM 
Annex5. 
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Figure 1.1 Naval Postgraduate School Organization 
3
 A definition of "tenant command" is provided in Appendix B. 
4
 A definition of "Interservice Support Agreement" is provided in Appendix B. 
5
 The POM annex are those facilities, located at Fort Ord, that remained open to 




























































Facilities Support Contracts 
Figure 1.2 Area of Research 
1. Primary Research Question 
The primary research question this thesis addresses is how Code 04's organization at 
the Naval Postgraduate School should restructure itself to better manage the base operations 
support agreements between NPS, its tenant commands, and the Presidio of Monterey and 
the POM Annex. 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
The secondary research questions are: What are the strengths and weaknesses of 
alternative organizational structures? How will restructuring alternatives affect available 
resources for Code 04? How much will the restructuring alternatives cost? 
The criteria I will use to make recommendations will be based upon the cost to 
manage the BOS agreements and increasing the coordination between NPS and its supported 
activities. 
B.        SCOPE 
The main thrust of this thesis is to present Code 04 with restructuring alternatives to 
support the increased BOS provided to the POM, the POM Annex, and other activities 
receiving BOS from NPS. The alternatives include include the strengths and weaknesses and 
costs associated with each alternative. 
4 
Research to determine other methods of improving BOS support, such as transferring 
workload to commercial activities or other agencies or conducting extensive functional 
analysis of entire departments, is beyond the scope of this thesis. In addition, this thesis is not 
intended to encompass activities other than NPS. 
C.       METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this research paper is based on the evaluation of the current 
ISA/BOS management situation. This evaluation is for purposes of recommending 
restructuring alternatives. Four sources of data are used in the evaluation process. 
1. Interviews 
Interviews were conducted with the Assistant Director of Military Operations and the 
Directors of Resource Management at NPS and the POM. Interviews were also be conducted 
within the Comptroller and Public Works departments of NPS. 
The type of questions asked during the interviews involved ISA/BOS background at 
NPS, how each interviewee views the problems associated with the coordination of the 
support agreements and how they would like to see the coordination process improved. 
2. Observations 
Observations were primarily of meetings between Code 04, NPS Comptroller (Code 
21) and Director of Resources at the Presidio of Monterey concerning the base operations 
support agreements. 
3. Time Studies 
Time studies were conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School in the Directors of 
Military Operations and Resource Management departments. The purpose for doing the time 
studies was to establish a baseline of who and how much time is spent on ISA/BOS issues. 
4. Archival Data 
Archival data for the thesis research came from a variety of sources, including the 
Comptroller and Director of Public Works at the Naval Postgraduate School, the Resource 
Management Office at the Presidio of Monterey, and the general management literature. 
D. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
The primary beneficiary of this study will be the Naval Postgraduate School. 
Specifically, the Directors of Resources, Military Operations and Public Works will be able 
to resolve coordination problems concerning management of the base operations support 
agreements with tenant commands and the Presidio of Monterey and POM Annex. Their 
involvement will be limited to major issues that require senior managements response. The 
secondary beneficiaries will be the tenant commands, the Presidio of Monterey, and the POM 
Annex who will be on the receiving end of the improved coordination. 
E. OUTLINE 
Chapter II is a literature review of the models used in redesigning organizations. The 
chapter presents an in-depth look at one model type and discusses four other types of models 
used to diagnose organization design problems. 
Chapter HI describes the research design methodology and the sources of data used 
in the research. The sources of data used are interviews, observations, archival, time study, 
and the redesigning organizations literature. 
Chapter IV presents the background and the findings from the research. The chapter 
summarizes the results from the interviews, observations, archival data, and the time study. 
Chapter V analyzes the data presented in Chapter IV. 
Chapter VI provides recommendations and conclusions. The chapter also provides 
areas for possible further research. 

II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Organization design is the making of decisions about the formal organizational 
arrangements, including the formal structures and the formal processes that make up an 
organization (Nadler and Tushman, 1988). When management perceives problems -with an 
organization's processes or output, all too often the decision to redesign the organization to 
correct the problem is made without a systematic review of the symptoms, the problems, and 
the solution. Managers have a tendency to jump from the symptoms to the solution without 
reviewing the underlying problems (Roberts, 1995). Leaping from the symptoms to the 
solution rarely addresses the problem that is prompting the symptom. In fact, such short cuts 
often exacerbate the underlying problem or compound difficulties elsewhere in the 
organization. To diagnose problems, mangers need to look at the organization as a whole 
system in order to understand how the parts interact to form the whole. 
To help managers think about organizations as a whole, conceptual frameworks, or 
models, have been developed that act as road maps to assist managers with design decisions. 
These models are critical because they assist in the collection of information about 
organization design problems and interpretation of specific problem types, and they act as 
guides for the analysis of problem solving and development of solutions. This chapter will 
discuss in detail one conceptual model and review several other models that are available for 
making design decisions. 
A.        THE CONGRUENCE MODEL 
Nadler and Tushman (1988) developed a congruence (or fit) model that specifies the 
critical inputs, the major outputs, and the transformation processes that characterize the 
organization's functions, see Figure 2.1. The model's basic premise is that organizations are 
constructed of components that interact with each other. The components of an organization 
can interact well and function effectively or they can interact poorly and cause dysfunction 



















Figure 2.1 Congruence Model (Nadler and Tushman, 1988) 
1. Input (Context) 
The input to an organization includes all the factors outside the organization that have 
a potential impact on the organization. They include other institutions, groups, events, etc. 
10 
The input can be put into the context of the organizations environment, resources, and 
history. See Table 2.1 for an overview of the organizational context. 
Table 2.1 Organization Context  
Environment Resources History 
Definition     All Factors, including Various assets to which the The pattern of past behavior, 
institutions, groups, organization has access, activity, and effectiveness of 
individuals, events, including human resources, the organization that may 
etc, that are outside technology, capital, affect current organizational 
the organization being information, etc, as well as functioning, 
analyzed but have a tangible resources, 
potential impact on 
- What have been the major 
stages or phases of the 
organization's development? 
- What is the current impact 
of such historical factors as 
strategic decisions, acts of 
key leaders, crises, and core 
values and norms? 
Source: Nadler and Tushman (1988) 
a. Environment 
Every organization exists within an environment. Specifically, this 
environment includes government and regulatory bodies, labor unions, special interest groups, 
customers, suppliers, etc. Nadler and Tushman (1988) list three critical factors of the 
environment that effect organizational functioning. (1) The environment makes demands on 
the organization. For example, a parent organization directs one of its organizations to 
provide specific services or perform certain tasks. (2) The environment may place constraints 
that organization. 
Critical - What demands does - What is the relative 
Features the environment make quality of the different 
for of the organization? resources to which the 
Analysis - How does the organization has access? 
environment put - To what extent are 
constraints on resources fixed rather than 
organizational action? flexible? 
11 
on the organization. An example here would be when an organization is prohibited : m 
hiring additional personnel due to a hiring freeze imposed by a regulatory body. (3) 'i„;e 
environment provides opportunities for the organization to explore. For example, when a 
competitor moves or goes out of business, an opportunity exists for an organization to 
increase its market share. 
b. Resources 
Organizations have various resources from which it can draw. They include 
personnel, technology, funding, etc. In terms of analysis, two aspects of resources are 
important - the relative quality of those resources and the flexibility of the resources. Poor 
resource quality such as an untrained work force or inferior materials can devastate an 
organization or certainly drive the organization's strategic thinking in ways that management 
would not desire. Having the ability to shift resources as necessary to take advantage of 
changing environmental conditions is essential for an organization to survive in a dynamic 
environment. 
c. History 
Institutional theorists such as Dimaggio and Powell (1987) argue that an 
organization's functions in large part based on the organization's norms and beliefs that were 
established at the inception of the organization. They further explain that past events in the 
history of the organization can dramatically alter the organization's core values and norms. 
12 
d. Summary 
The organization's environment, resources, and history generally cannot be 
changed in the short run. It's from the environmental setting that managers make strategic 
decisions. Nadler and Tushman (1988) point out that organization strategy is reflected in 
those strategic decisions that allocate resources based on demands, constraints and 
opportunities. In basic terms, an organization's strategy is derived from its environment, the 
resources it has to operate with, and the past experiences of the organization. 
2. Output 
Nadler and Tushman (1988) argue that, looking from the organizational level, it is 
possible to identify several critical aspects of organizational output: how well the organization 
meets its objectives as determined by strategy, how efficiently the organization utilizes 
available resources, and how well the organization adapts to a changing environment. 
These aspects are important from the organizational perspective, but there are other 
aspects such as the group or the individual perspective that reveal other effects on 
organizational output. Stress, job satisfaction, intra-departmental relationships all add or take 
away from the organization's effectiveness. An example would be when employees are not 
rewarded based on performance but, instead, on personality or some common theme such as 
race, religion, or gender. An organization operating in this type of environment will more 
often than not create tension, ill will, and a general distrust of the management which will 
cause the employees to work inefficiently and less effectively. 
13 
3. Transformation Process 
The congruence model places its greatest emphasis on the transformation process. 
This process takes the environment, available resources, and history of the organization and 
transforms them into an effective output. Nadler and Tushman (1988) describe four major 
components of the transformation process in an organization: (1) the tasks, (2) the 
individuals, (3) the formal organization arrangements, and (4) the informal organization. See 
Table 2.2 for an overview of these components. 
a. Tasks 
The task component of an organization emphasizes specific work activities, 
or functions, that need to be accomplished. Assuming the purpose for performing a task is 
to fulfill some aspect of the organization's strategy, the task is the starting point for analyzing 
the other three components of the organization. This is particularly critical for analyzing an 
organization for possible redesign. Since we organize to get work done it is important to 
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The individuals in an organization provide the knowledge and skills necessary 
to perform the required tasks. The critical aspects to consider in this component are the 
different needs or preferences individuals bring to the organization and the perceptions and 
expectations they develop. 
c. Formal Organizational Arrangements 
These include the structure, processes, methods, and procedures that are 
required to perform tasks consistent with the organization's strategy. Some examples of 
formal organizational arrangements are grouping work along functional lines, coordination 
and control mechanisms, reward systems, and physical location of work units. 
d Informal Organization 
Regardless of how well an organization is designed to encompass all possible 
work flows, informal organizations will develop over time. Informal organizations emerge 
to complement the formal organization structure 01 in a reaction to the formal structure. In 
either case, the informal organization structure can aid or hinder the performance of an 
organization (Nadler and Tushman, 1988). 
e. Summary 
In general, the transformation process enables the general manager to assess 
the degree of congruence, or fit, between two or more components. As one example, tasks 
require skills and knowledge from those who perform them. Individuals in turn bring their 
16 
level of skill and knowledge to the tasks. If the individual's characteristics match the task 
requirements there is a good fit and the organization's performance will be more effective. 
Nadler and Tushman further explain (Figure 2.1) that the whole organization 
exhibits a degree of congruence in the same way that pairs of components in the 
transformation process exhibit congruence. In fact, the greater the total fit among all the 
components, the more effective the organization will be. 
The strength of the Congruence Model is its thoroughness and systematic-flow 
perspective. The model guides the user through the diagnostic process which, if done 
correctly, will provide the user with tools for organization redesign. A weakness of this 
model is its complexity and the time required to properly develop the model. 
An important implication of the congruence model is that is provides a general 
organizing framework. More specific models such as an information processing model (see 
Figure 2.2) would be required in order to define levels of congruence deep within the formal 
organizational structure. 
The information processing model can be thought of as an expansion of the 
task and organizational arrangement sections of the congruence model. The task 
characteristics are described on the left, the key elements of the organizational arrangements 
on the right, and the fit line in the middle. 
The model provides direction for making organization design decisions in a 
two step process: analysis of work done by the organization in order to determine the 
17 
information processing requirements required by the work and construction of an organization 
design that provides the needed information processing capacity. 
Unpredictability of Task 
Environmental Effects on 
Task 
Interdependence 
of Task Elements 
Uncertainty of Task Inform ation-Processing Requirements to Do Task 
^ Grouping 
Information-Processing 






Figure 2.2 Information Processing Model (Nadler and Tushman, 1988) 
B.        PROBLEM ANALYSIS PROCESS 
To use the congruence model in a systematic manner, a manager needs to gather 
information on the inputs/outputs of the organization, symptoms of the organization's 
problem, the causes of the problem, formulation of action plans to correct the problem, and 
implementation of the action plans. To assist management with this task, Nadler and 
Tushman have developed several steps to follow to analyze an organization's problems. (See 
Table 2.3 for an overview of the process). 
Table 2.3 lists only the initial steps in organizational problem analysis. After the 
problem has been identified, actions plans are formulated and implemented. Management 
18 
must monitor the changes to determine if they are producing the desired effect or if further 
analysis is needed to correct the problem. 
Table 2.3 Steps in Organizational Problem Analysis  
Step Explanation 
1. Identify issues 
2. Specify input 
3. Identify output 
4. Identify problems 
5. Describe components of the 
organization 
6. Assess congruence (fit) 
7. Generate hypothesis 
8. Identify action steps 
List data indicating possible existence of 
problems. 
Identify the system. 
Determine nature of environment, 
resources, and history. 
Identify data that defines the nature of 
output at various levels (individual, 
group/unit, organization). Should include 
desired output as derived from strategy 
and actual output being obtained. 
Identify areas where there are significant 
and meaningful differences between 
desired and actual output. 
Describe basic nature of each of the four 
components with emphasis on its critical 
features. 
Analyze relative congruence among 
components. 
Analyze to associate fit with specific 
problem. 
Indicate what possible actions might deal 
with causes of problems. 
Source: Nadler and Tushman (1988) 
19 
C.       OTHER DESIGN MODELS 
1. The Star Model 
Galbraith (1995) developed a model specifically for helping management select an 






Figure 2.3 Star Model (Galbraith, 1995) 
manager needs to focus his attention for the purpose of producing an effective and efficient 
organizational design. The first category, strategy, determines the direction of the 
organization. The second, structure, determines the location of power and decision making 
in the organization. Processes determine the information flow within the organization and 
provide insight into the informal organizational structure. The reward system provides 
employee motivation to work towards the organization's goals. The people policies provide 
20 
the employees with the proper training and knowledge to perform their tasks and also 
motivates the employee. 
One of the implications of the Star Model is that similar strategies can produce 
different organizational designs. Though two different organizations have similar strategies, 
factoring in the environment, people, rewards, and processes can produce a very different 
organizational structure. An example would be when two firms have the same strategy of 
increasing market share by becoming the low cost producer. One of the firms, which has been 
in the business for a long period of time, has established processes, routines, and reward 
systems that have become rigid, hierarchical, and mechanistic. The other firm, being new to 
the business, might have less rigid processes and reward systems and a very flat design. 
However, this is not to say the firms could not be reversed in their situations, with the new 
firm being hierarchical and the older firm more flat. 
Another implication of the Star Model is its design. The star shape shows the 
connections between the categories and how they must "fit" together for the organization to 
be effective. The "fit" aspect of the Star Model resembles the Congruence Model, but on a 
less detailed scale. 
The strength of the Star Model is its simplicity in design. Galbraith designed the 
model as a tool for executive level management to evaluate their organization's design. A 
weakness of the model can also be its simplicity. Relying solely on the Star Model as a 
reference source could result in a misdiagnosis of the problem and could worsen the situation 
or cause additional problems. 
21 
2. Weisbord's Six Box Model 
Weisbord's (1967) model is useful because it helps managers visualize reality and it 
is relatively simple in design. (See Figure 2.4). The model is like a radar screen with "blips" 
that tell the manager about organizational highlights and issues (Burke, 1987). 
Figure 2.4 Weisbord's Six-Box Model (Weisbord, 1988) 
Weisbord asks key diagnostic questions for each of the six categories. (See Table 
2.4). The questions in each of the categories are directed at the formal and informal 
organization. Weisbord feels the key aspect of organizational diagnosis is the gap between 
the formal dimensions of the organization and the informal. An example would be the official 
22 
Standard operating procedures of the organization as compared to how operations are actually 
conducted. 
Table 2.4 Weisbord's Matrix for Data Analysis  
Formal System 
(Work To Be Done) 
Informal System 




4. Rewards (Incentives) 
5. Leadership 
6. Helpful mechanisms 
Goal clarity. 
Functional, program, or 
matrix? 
Who should deal with 
whom on what? 
Which technologies should 
be used? 
Explicit system 
What is it? 







How is work actually done 
or not done? 
How well do they do it? 
Quality of relationships? 
Modes of conflict 
management? 
Implicit, psychic rewards 
What do people Feel about 
payoffs? 
How? 
What are they actually used 
for? How do they function 
in practice? How are 
systems subverted? 
Source: Weisbord, 1976. 
In summary, the simplicity of Weisbord's model lends itself to managers who have 
difficulty in thinking of the organization as an interconnected system as defined by his 
categories. In addition, if the manager is under a time constraint and doesn't have time to 
diagnose his organization with a more complex model, such as the congruence model, the 
manager can use this model. 
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3. Hornstein and Tichy's Emergent Pragmatic Model 
Hornstein and Tichy's organizational diagnosis model is probably closer to a theory 
than a model. Their premise is that most managers and consultants carry around in their 
heads implicit models about organizational behavior (Burke, 1987). Hornstein and Tichy 
argue that more structured models, such as those presented earlier, impose the author's 
values, beliefs, and norms on the organization. What is needed is a process the consultant and 
manager can use to combine their knowledge to develop a model that is organization-specific 
- sort of "do-it-yourself modeling. 
According to Burke (1987), the Emergent Pragmatic Model uses a workbook in 
which the managers select the topics they would seek to use in diagnosing an organization. 
The workbook includes such items as goals, informal characteristics, satisfaction of 
employees, etc. The managers then develop categories of organizational components and 
place their topics into the appropriate category. Next the managers imagine change in each 
component and think through how that change would effect the other components. The 
resultant matrix shows which components the managers believe are the most and least 
significant in terms of impact on the other components. This ranking of categories gives the 
managers a visual model from which they base their strategies and techniques for change. 
The next phases of the model are concerned with establishing the criteria for assuring 
success with the organizational change. These criteria usually stem from the organization's 
history regarding change, budget considerations, the norms and beliefs of the employees and 
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management, etc. In the final phase, criteria are developed to evaluate the success or failure 
of the change strategy. 
According to Burke (1987), the strength of the Emergent Pragmatic Model is based 
on two assumptions: (1) that most managers and consultants have intuitive theories about the 
organization's function and (2) that other models impose too much structure on the manager 
and might inhibit the manager from developing a diagnostic strategy more congruent with 
the organization's environment. The weakness of the Emergent Pragmatic Model is the time 
and energy required on the part of management to diagnose the organization's problems. 
Management participation is central in developing the model used for the diagnosis. In the 
other models, the consultant does the majority of research based on a predefined model. 
4. Summary 
From review of the literature it is apparent there are many models available to 
diagnose organizational problems. The four I picked are a representation from the complex, 
(Nadler and Tushman, 1988) to the simple, (Galbraith 1995, and Weisbord, 1988), to the 
emergent, (Hornstein and Tichy, 1987) . There are models that have very specific functions 
that emphasize different aspects of an organization, such as the financial, economic, or, as 
figure 2.2 depicts, the information processing aspect. Table 2.5 summarizes the strengths and 
weaknesses of each of the models presented. 
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Table 2.5 Models Strengths and Weaknesses 
Model Strengths Weaknesses 




Star Model Simple to use 
Useful when there is a time 
constraint 
Could be too simplistic for 
complex problems 
Weisbord's Model When a relatively 
uncomplicated 
organizational map is 
needed quickly 
Could be too simplistic for 
complex problems 
Emergent Pragmatic Model Lack of structure enables 
managers to develop 
models based on their 
experiences and intuitions 
Time and energy required 
of management to properly 
use model 
Source: Burke, 1987 
D. WHEN TO REDESIGN AN ORGANIZATION 
The design models presented above provide a means of determining when an 
organizational redesign is required. Using the congruence model (Figure 2.1), when an 
organization evolves to the point where "the fit" between formal organizational arrangements 
and other components is no longer congruent, a redesign of the organization should be 
considered (Nadler and Tushman, 1988). In contrast to evolving when an organization 
anticipates or knows of situations that will lead to a poor fit between the components, such 
as major environmental or resource changes, this could signify a need to redesign the 
organization as well. Some of the more common situations that require a redesign of an 
organization are the following: 
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1. Strategy Shift 
Strategic shifts may be required because of environmental factors such as new 
regulations, competition, change in resources, etc. When an organization's environment 
changes that can drive a strategy shift that leads to redefine the business, its products and the 
customers it services. 
2. Task Redefinition 
The incorporation of new technologies into the organization can result in changes in 
work flow or, in the extreme, the positions of the entire work unit can become obsolete. 
Changes in resource quality or availability can shift emphasis in an organization to require 
more or less staffing in critical areas. 
3. Change in People 
In organizations where senior management changes every two or three years, 
organization redesign might become routine. This is particularly true for military 
organizations, where the commanding officer and all other senior military managers are 
routinely transferred. What exacerbates the problem for the military is the fact that managers 
rarely come from within the organization. They bring to the organization their own ideas and 
beliefs about what should be its direction. 
4. Growth 
Growth in size or scope of an organization is one of the typical problems that require 
redesign of the organization. When organizations are small, many of the mechanisms that 
control behavior, work-flow, and motivation can be informal. When an organization increases 
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its size those mechanisms can become awkward and too simple to manage more complex 
relationships. 
5.        Political/Culture Change 
Political or cultural changes can come about through changes in the organization's 
environment. When an organization is directed to provide new and varied services to other 
organizations that have their own culture, a clash between the organizations can result and 
[(■ i to mistrust and suspicion of each other. What one organization considers to be critical 
can be entirely opposite of what another organization perceives as critical. 
The above situations are what might typically justify an organization redesign. But 
those situations by themselves are not justification enough for launching into a new design. 
Management must determine the symptoms that are being experienced in order to diagnose 
the problem correctly. As Table 2.3 points out, the first step in organizational problem 
analysis is to identify the symptoms that might be linked to organizational design problems. 
Table 2.6 list several types of symptoms to look for. 
28 






Cross-unit projects that do not get done. 
Work groups out of step with the rest of 
the organization. 
Excessive conflict between groups internal 
or external to the organization. 
Individuals are asking excessive questions 
about what their job entails. 
Functions may overlap and "turf" fights 
become more frequent. 
Resources do not get to employees who 
need them. 
Employee skills are under-utilized. 
Flow of Work Foul-ups, slow-downs, confusion in what 
is the next step, reduced responsiveness to 
customer needs, etc. 
Proliferation of Extra-organizational Units    Excessive use of special meetings to 
resolve crisis situations. 
New committees or task forces for each 
new situation. 
Source: Nadler and Tushman, 1988 
These symptoms are not inclusive nor are they full-proof reasons for organizational 
redesign. However, they frequently indicate that an organization design problem exists and 
redesign should at least be considered (Nadler and Tushman, 1988). 
When an organization exhibits symptoms of noncongruence between its components, 
and the models provide evidence of a problem, the next step would be to review the 
organization's strategy and match it with a structure. This will establish a framework for 
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developing formal linking mechanisms that will aid in correcting the noncongruence between 
the organization's different components. 
There are several types of formal structural linking mechanisms to choose from. The 
most simple is the hierarchy linking mechanism. As its name implies, the hierarchy linking 
mechanism relies heavily on the manager who controls and coordinates all the major functions 
of the group. The manager serves as the nerve center for the group and maintains the 
majority of the corporate knowledge concerning the group's work processes. The hierarchy 
linking mechanism is one of the oldest and pervasive of all the linking mechanisms. It serves 
a useful purpose in relatively simple mechanistic organizations where the output is easily 
defined. The hierarchy structure runs into difficulty when task interdependencies develop 
between groups under different managers. In this type of organization the manager becomes 
quickly overloaded. 
Other structural linking mechanisms such as liaison groups, integrators, and matrix 
structures are needed when complex information exchanges are required between groups 
within an organization or between two separate organizations. The decision to use one of 
these linking mechanisms needs be based on several factors: the cost and/or resources used, 
the mechanism's dependency on the informal organization, and the information processing 
requirements. Table 2.7 compares the structural linking mechanisms with the above decision 
factors. 
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Table 2.7 Consequences of Structural Linking Mechanisms 
Information 
Dependence on Processing 
Cost Informal Organization Capacity 
High High High 
Matrix Organization ? t T 
Integrator Roles 1 1 1 
Liaison 1 1 1 
Hierarchy 1 1 1 
Low Low Low 
Source: Nadler and Tushman (1988) 
Choosing the structural linking mechanism is a critical aspect in an organization 
redesign. Selecting a matrix type mechanism when a liaison person or group would suffice 
will waste resources, add to the problems it was designed to correct, and duplicate effort. 
Managers must choose the linking mechanisms that fit the organization's requirements. In 
addition, the manager must factor in the effect the linking mechanism will have on the reward 
and control system of the organization. Employees pay close attention to the factors that 
affect their formal and informal rewards. If there are obvious problems with the reward 
system and the structural linking, the organization performance will suffer. 
Structural linking is not the only device to solve coordination problems within an 
organization. A good informal organization can ease the complexity of information 
processing in a matrix type of structure. However, for purposes of this thesis, only structural 
linking mechanisms will be analyzed. The strengths and weaknesses of the various linking 




A.       INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is an action research study diagnosing Code 04's management of BOS 
agreements. This chapter discusses the methodology employed in the data collection and the 
limitations the methodology imposes. 
Action research is a data-based, problem solving process that replicates the steps 
involved in the scientific method of inquiry (French and Bell, 1978). The key aspects of the 
process are diagnosis, data gathering, feedback to whom the research is for, data discussion, 
and action. For this research paper, recommendations for change were developed from a 
diagnosis of the data using the literature review as a guide. The findings were provided to 
Codes 04A and 21 for discussion and action. 
The majority of the data collection in this research paper was of a qualitative nature. 
A qualitative strategy was used because the nature of the research question lends itself to 
evaluation of the process Code 04 uses to manage BOS. The qualitative methods used 
included interviews, observations, and archival research. 
Quantitative data collection was included in the data collection as well. The purpose 
for using quantitative data was to add an element of depth, detail, and standardization to the 
qualitative data. The quantitative method used was a time study. 
33 
B.        STRATEGY 
1.        Qualitative Methods 
a.        Interviews 
The interview process used the informal conversational approach and the 
general interview guideline approach to collect data. The informal conversational approach 
relies heavily on the spontaneous generation of questions during the natural flow of 
conversation. The general interview guide approach is based on predetermined areas to 
explore during an interview (Patton, 1987). 
For the interview process, six interviewees were selected. From NPS, under 
the Director of Military Operations, the Assistant Director of Military Operations, Code 04 A, 
and the Public Works Officer, Code 43 were interviewed. These two positions were selected 
to be interviewed because they are directly responsible for providing BOS to other commands 
and for drafting the ISAs. Under the Director of Resource Management, the Comptroller, 
Code 21, the Physical Operations Division manager , Code 211, and the Base Operating 
Support Branch supervisor were interviewed. They were interviewed because each of those 
positions provide critical input to drafting the ISAs and for monitoring the ISA funding status. 
One interview was conducted with the Director of Resource Management, 
Presidio of Monterey. The POM was selected because it is the largest command receiving 
BOS from NPS. The purpose of this interview was to gain insight into the "customer's" 
perspective on Code 04 management of the ISA. A point to note is that the POM is NPS' 
largest BOS customer; however, there are over 25 other commands for which NPS is 
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providing some level of BOS. A sample of the type of questions and the reason why they 
were asked is provided in Appendix C. 
b. Archival Records 
Archival records were used to gain an understanding of the history of BOS 
agreements between NPS and its customers. Specifically, the background that was the 
catalyst for the ISA between NPS and the POM was essential in understanding the problems 
Code 04 is having managing ISAs in general. 
Review of primary archival data such as the ISA documents, funding totals 
from funding documents, and regulations manuals and instructions provided were 
instrumental in understanding the foundation, interdependence, and scope of ISAs between 
the providing command and the customer. The use of correspondence and presentations, as 
secondary archival data, was key in being able to quickly determine issues of concern and the 
magnitude of effect a new ISA would have on NPS. 
c. Observations 
Observations primarily consisted of attending a meeting between NPS and the 
POM concerning development of a revised ISA to replace the current one. Attendance at this 
meeting allowed me to better understand the relationship between the provider, NPS, and the 
customer, the POM. In addition, this direct observational approach allowed me to learn about 
issues that did not necessarily come up in the interview process. 
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2. Quantitative Method 
For quantitative data I used a time study to determine who in Codes 02 and 04 were 
devoting time to ISA and BOS issues. The purpose of thi time study was to establish a 
baseline of time the participants up and down the organization hierarchy spend on ISA and 
EOS issues. The criteria for accounting for time worked on ISA and BOS issues, and a copy 
;.f the tims study worksheet, is provided in Appendix D. 
C        LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
No ;esearch methodology is perfect. The objective is to select the best method' 'ogy 
tor the circumstances and be able to justify that choice (Buckley, Buckley and Chang, 1976). 
Below are the limitations of the methodologies employed in this study. 
1. Qualitative 
a. Interviews 
Opinions given during an interview represent different perceptions and hence 
may not accurately represent reality. The interviewee injects his opinions, personal beliefs, 
and views into his responses that may (unintentionally or intentionally) promote his 
objectives. In this research project, I was an outsider (intruder) looking for answers to 
questions I thought were relevant to the research question. Being an outsider, I could be 
perceived as a threat to the interviewee or the organization. The interviewee's responses to 
my questions could be couched to hide problems that they feel would reflect badly on them 
or the organization if they were made public. Further, I have no way of knowing if the 
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questions I asked were probing enough to formulate an accurate understanding of the 
situation. 
b. Archival Records 
The archival records I reviewed were primarily from issues dealing with the 
POM and the POM Annex. The records were briefs, presentations, and correspondence put 
together, for the most part, for informational purposes. This medium of archival data reflects 
a certain "selective retrieval" of information beyond my control. In other words, the 
information in the archival records I had access to were the product of another individual's 
beliefs of what was pertinent. Another factor was my inability to comprehend all the data I 
was reviewing. Interviews mitigated this somewhat, but obvious references were made in the 
correspondence to situations I had no knowledge of nor could I easily master during the 
interview process. 
c. Observations 
The limitations with observations were primarily concerning the limited 
number of situations that could be observed. Problems between NPS and its customers 
concerning ISAs are not scheduled; they are spontaneously driven by events. The only 
observation I was able to do was at a meeting between NPS and the POM concerning the 
contents of the revised ISA. 
2. Quantitative (Time Study) 
The data collected from the time study required the participants to accurately record 
the amount of time they spent on ISA/BOS issues. Problems with the accuracy could arise 
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if the participant waited several days before recording the time. Distortions in the amount of 
time spent working on the issues are more easily induced when there is a long gap between 
when the work was done and its recording in the time study. 
The participants could also intentionally distort the amount of time to bolster their 
own agendas or sabotage someone else's. Another limitation could be the length in days and 
the time of year the study took place. If the study does not cover enough days to obtain an 
accurate representation of a daily average or the time of year is a particularly heavy or light 
period of ISA/BOS work, the data will be distorted. 
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IV. DATA PRESENTATION 
A.        BACKGROUND 
1.        Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) 
On November 5, 1990, President Bush signed Public Law 101-510, which established 
the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission. The Commission's mandate was, 
"to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military 
installations inside the United States" (BRAC 1993 Report to the President). The Public Law 
required the Secretary of Defense to submit a list of proposed military base closures and 
realignments to the Commission by March 15, 1993. The proposed closure and realignment 
list was based on the force structure plan submitted to Congress and on selection criteria 
developed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by Congress. 
As part of its review and analysis process, the Commission solicited information from 
a wide variety of sources, including the communities whose bases were recommended by the 
Secretary of Defense for closure or realignment. Based on the Commission's review and 
analysis and deliberations with the communities involved, the Commission recommended to 
the President that 130 bases be closed and 45 bases be realigned. 
a. Army Recommendation to the Secretary of Defense 
The Army recommended closing the Presidio of Monterey (POM) and the 
Presidio of Monterey Annex (formally Fort Ord); Relocating the Defense Language Institute 
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(DLI), located at the POM, to Fort Huachuca, Arizona; and contracting the foreign language 
training with a public university at or near the fort. 
The Army, as Executive Agent for the Defense Language Program, argued 
that DLI has a high operating overhead in both facilities and staff. The school supports over 
4,000 students and staff and offers training in 20 languages (BRAC 1993 Report to the 
President). The Army stated that contracting foreign language training with an existing 
university-level institution would create significant savings in operational overhead. In 
addition, the Army further stated that Fort Huachuca, home of the Army Intelligence school, 
would be an ideal location for DLI because integrating the foreign language students with the 
intelligence school would produce better qualified soldiers and would increase overhead costs 
only marginally. 
b.        Monterey Community Concerns 
The Monterey community argued that movement of DLI posed a serious 
threat to national security. They further stated the Army never conducted a commercial 
activities study6 before recommending contract language training. The community also 
pointed out that Fort Huachuca had limited water resources, which were in litigation, and 
insufficient housing to support the additional students. 
The community maintained that the POM Annex (old Fort Ord) was oversized. 
Specifically, the DLI required only 803 housing units on the Annex, the post exchange and 
6
 A definition of "commercial activities studies" is provided in Appendix B. 
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commissary. The remainder could be excessed. Additionally, the community disputed th 
base operating costs for the Presidio of Monterey, arguing that a consolidated base operations 
agreement between NPS and DLI would greatly reduce costs and ensure the retention of DLI 
at the POM. 
c. Commission Findings 
The commission agreed that movement of DLI would be a disruption that 
would not be in the best interest of national security. However, the commission found the 
actual return on investment for the Army's recommendation depended on extraordinary base 
operations costs, caused in large part by an oversized support facility at the POM Annex 
(BRAC 1993 Report to the President). The commission agreed with the Monterey 
communities' assessment of the situation, in that the Army did not explore other cost saving 
alternatives such as consolidation of base operating support with NPS or commercial 
activities studies. 
d Commission Recommendations 
The commission did not follow the Secretary of Defense recommendation of 
closing the POM and the POM Annex. Instead, the commission recommended retaining the 
POM and disposing of all facilities at the POM Annex except the housing, commissary, child 
care facility, and post exchange required to support the POM and NPS. The commission 
further recommended consolidating base operations with NPS by interservice support 
agreement (ISA). 
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NPS and the POM entered into ISA negotiations to provide the POM and the 
POM Annex with BOS during the spring of 1994. The IS As between NPS and the POM 
were formalized and signed in June 1994, with an effective date of October 1, 1994. After 
approximately a year under the ISAs, NPS and the POM are presently negotiating a new ISA 
f.o replace the existing one for public works support. The new ISA will include items that 
were not covered or were vague under the existing ISA. The new public works ISA's cost 
to the POM is estimated to be $12.65 million, an increase of $3 million from the existing 
ISA. he mcrease in cost is primarily for improving family housing at the POM and POM 
Annex 
B.        INTERVIEW AND ARCHIVAL DATA 
Management of BOS at NPS is dependent on what is covered under the ISA. In 
general, ISA management is divided between two departments: the Public Works Department 
(Code 43), who writes the ISA and performs work specified in the ISA; and, the Comptroller 
Department (Code 21), who monitors the funding levels on the ISA by coordinating with 
Public Works and the activity provided BOS. (Review Figure 1.2). Not all BOS is provided 
by Public Works. For example, the postage costs an activity incurs are processed through the 
Comptroller Department without Public Works involvement. 
Table 4.1 lists the current ISAs in effect and the projected funding required to perform 
the work or service specified in the ISAs. Figure 4.1 illustrates the relative size in dollar 
terms of the ISAs. 
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Table 4.1 NPS Interservice Support Agreements 
Activity Date Established Length Expiration Date Yearly Cost to 
Tenant 
Army Soldier Support Center 11/89 5yn> 12/94 $                          1,500 
California National Guard1 
Coast Guard2 9/91 6yra 10/97 5(600) 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service 10/94 Indefinite Indefinite $                           725,000 
Defense Health Resource Study Center 1/94 indefinite Indefinite $                             18,050 
Defense Investigative Service 9/92 6yrs 7/98 $                             15,000 
Defense Language Institute Housing Assignments0 10/94 Indefinite Indefinite $                               2,970 
Defense Manpower Data Center 6/84 indefinite Indefinite $                       4,425,000 
Defense Printing Service 7/92 5yrs 10/97 $                             12,400 
Defense Resource Management Institute 2/76 Indefinite Indefinite $                       3,000,000 
Defense Security Assistance Agency1 
Dental Clinic4 11/81 5yrs 1/86 
Engineering Field Activity, West 8/92 6yrs 7/98 $                             14,000 
Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center 7/92 5yrs 10/97 $                        1,533,000 
Institute for Defense Education and Analysis5 
National Weather Service0 $                              5,000 
Naval Criminal Investigative Service 6/92 6yrs 5/98 $                               1,500 
Naval Resale Activity 6/91 5yrs 10/9« $                           105,000 
Naval Research Laboratory 11/91 6yrs 1/97 $                           178,700 
Naval Reserve Center 8/94 imli' fuiih1 Indefinite $                             14,130 
Naval Security Group Det.1 5/94 Indefinite Indefinite 
Personnel Security Research and Education 3/91 6yi5 2/97 $                           155,000 
Personnel Support Activity Det. 4/87 Indefinite indefinite $                            20,200 
POM/public works* 10/94 Indefinite Indefinite $                      12,650,000 
POM/fire protection 10/94 indefinite Indefinite $                        1,151,446 
POM/caretaker 10/94 Indefinite Indefinite $                        1,131,189 
Public Health Service' 
Scheduled Airline Ticket Office 11/78 Indefinite Indefinite -0- 
Training and Doctrine Analysis Command 10/90 6yrs 9/9« $                          465,500 
U.S. Post Office 10/73 Indefinite Indefinite -0- 
Veterans Administration Clinic0 3/95 «EndeSnite Indefinite 
TOTAL' $            25,623,985 
Source: Interview with Code 43 Administrative Officer, August 14, 1995 
' On hold pending notification of support requirements. 
2
 NPS reimburses the Coast Guard for use of Coast Guard piers. 
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3
 Based on $594 per foreign student (five students) living at the POM Annex. 
" Based on revised draft ISA. 
5
 Waiting on ISA status from customer. 
6
 Draft ISA being prepared. 





Figure 4.1 NPS ISA Chart (Interview with Code 43's Administrative Officer, August 14, 
1995) 
1. ISA Background 
In general, the type of work or service provided on an ISA includes electricity, 
gas (natural), potable water, steam, janitorial, air-conditioning, building and grounds 
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maintenance, fire protection, postage, automated data processing, etc. When activities other 
than NPS request that services or work be performed by NPS, the vehicle used to establish 
the bilateral agreement is a Department of Defense form 1144 (DD1144), Interservice 
Support Agreement, a Memorandum of Understanding, or a Memorandum of Agreement7. 
All three types of bilateral agreements establish a "provider-customer" relationship (DoD 
Instruction 4000.19). For purposes of this thesis, all agreement vehicles will be referred to 
as ISAs. 
2. ISA Development 
When an activity requests NPS to perform work or service, the activity will provide 
a description of the needed work to Code 43 via Code 04. Code 43 will scope the work 
based on the description and submit a cost estimate to the customer activity. When the ISA 
is large and complex, as was the case with the ISAs between NPS and the POM, several 
meetings may be needed to complete the agreement. When the ISA is acceptable to both 
parties, the activity commander and the NPS Superintendent will sign the ISA formalizing 
the agreement. Once the ISA is formalized, the work and or service specified in the ISA may 
begin. 
3. ISA Execution 
Figure 4.2 is a representation of how work and or service is provided by NPS and 
reimbursed by the customer activity.   Basically the need (step (1)), is conveyed by the 
7
 A definition of "Memorandum of Understanding" and "Memorandum of 
Agreement" is provided in Appendix B. 
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customer to Code 43 during the ISA development. Code 43 provides the ISA with a cost 
estimate of the work and/or service, based on negotiations with the customer, and forwards 
the ISA to Code 21 for review (step (2)). If Code 21 agrees with the cost estimates, he will 
sign the ISA and forward it to the Superintendent for signature. After the Superintendent 
signs, the ISA is forwarded to the customer. The ISA provides the customer with a cost 
estimate for work requested (step (3)). The customer provides Code 21 accounting data via 
a Military Interdepartment Purchase Request (MEPR) or some other funding document (step 
(4)). The comptroller will notify Public Works that funds are available to start work (step 
(5)). As work progresses (step (6)), Public Works will keep the Comptroller informed of the 
labor and materials used to perform the work (step (7)). The Comptroller will notify the 
customer and Public Works of funds remaining (step (8)). This process continues in a cycle 
as long as the customer requests work or services from NPS. The customer is billed by the 
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Defense Finance and Accounting System (DFAS) based on accounting input from Code 21. 
(Not shown in Figure 4.2). 
(1) Need 
(5) Funding Available 
/8) Funds Remaining 
tiding Reg« 
(8) Fund's kemalning 
Figure 4.2 ISA Work Flow Model (Interview with BOS Manager, August 14, 
1995) 
4. ISA Support to the POM 
The IS As between NPS and the POM are some of the largest interservice support 
agreements in DoD, with a total reimbursable cost of $9.8 million. With the new public 
works ISA being negotiated, the total estimated reimbursable cost will be $14.93 million. The 
increase in reimbursable cost is primarily due to the Army providing additional family housing 
money to upgrade base housing at the POM and POM Annex. An overview of the POM 
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facilities covered under the IS As along with a comparison with NPS' facilities is provided in 
Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 Facilities Overview 














Source: Interview with NPS Comptroller (Code 21), June 14, 1995 
Based on the new ISA being negotiated, the support provided and cost to the POM 
and POM Annex is summarized in Table 4.3. The caretaker functions include building 
maintenance, utility systems and road repair. Public Works support includes maintenance of: 
classrooms, barracks, offices, housing, etc; utility systems; grounds maintenance; and, 
housing office operations. 
Table 4.3 ISA Support Provided to the POM 
Support Cost(millions) 
Fire Protection and Prevention $1.10 
Caretaker functions for Fort Ord land not yet $1.10 
conveyed to other government agencies 
Public Works support $12.65 
Source: Interview with NPS Comptroller (Code 21), June 14, 1995 
To support the additional work, NPS hired additional civilian personnel in Codes 04 
and 02.   (See Table 4.4). The majority of these additional hires' salaries are reimbursed by 
the POM under the IS As at no cost to NPS.   No increases in navy officers or enlisted 
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personnel were provided as a result of the additional work load.   The appendix to the 
NPS/POM ISA, 1994, lists the positions hired and their salaries. 
Table 4.4 Personnel Additions to NPS 
Function Personnel 
Public Works (Code 43) 138 
Firefighting 26 




Source: Interview with NPS Comptroller (Code 21), June 14, 1995 
5. Other Interview Data 
One of the themes noted in responses to interview questions from Codes 21 and 04 
was the lack of coordination in managing IS As. Code 21 mentioned the problem of Public 
Works not charging the job order that had been ear-marked for a specific purpose. Work 
under that job order would be accomplished, but it would be charged to some other job order 
or, in the worst case, NPS would absorb the cost. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the complex interdependencies required to properly manage 
IS As. Presently, NPS does not have an overall manager or group that ties together the Public 
Works and Comptroller functions with respect to IS As. What happens is that Code 04A and 
21 are drawn in to solve problems when they go unchecked at lower levels. This is caused 
by Public Works staff assuming a certain set of circumstances and the Comptroller staff 
another set. The staffs end up pulling in opposite directions because there isn't a coordinating 
function within the two staffs. 
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Another theme that was consistent among Codes 04A, 21 and 43 was the feeling of 
being overwhelmed by the number of IS As. Prior to the IS As with the POM, managers 
(Codes 04A, 21 and 43) were able to stay on top of ISA issues. But, when the POM ISAs 
were established, so much more time was directed to the POM ISAs that other ISAs were 
beginning to become a burden on management. At management levels below Codes 43 and 
21, the addition of the POM ISAs did not seem to be a major issue. There were numerous 
meetings and discussions to resolve issues when the ISAs were first established, but now the 
"overwhelmed" feeling seems to have dissipated at the lower management levels. 
The coordination of funds in Code 04 was another concern of the interviewees. Code 
04 has 10 other departments in addition to Code 43. Each of those departments has its own 
budget that is independent of the other departments. Code 04A has been dubbed the "money 
guy" for Code 04 and, as such, coordinates budgeting, accounting, and exercises internal 
fiscal review and control of the departments in Code 04. The concern on the part of Code 21 
is that Code 04A doesn't have the time or manpower to properly coordinate the budgets for 
all eleven departments. Review of NPS' organization and regulations manual, 
NAVPGSCOLINST 5400.2C, provides little direction for the coordination of Code 04's 
department budgets. The only statement in 5400.2C that could be interpreted as addressing 
the budget issue is, "perform such other duties as may be assigned by the Director of Military 
Operations (Code 04)." 
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C.        OBSERVATION DATA 
The observation data I obtained was based on a meeting between NPS and the POM 
concerning the draft of the new ISA that Code 43 was developing. The POM's concern with 
the draft ISA (and I assume with the IS As presently in place as well) was the assurance that 
NPS personnel for whom the POM was reimbursing NPS were actually working on POM 
projects. Code 43 pointed out that, even though the POM was paying for billets at NPS, at 
any given time POM reimbursable personnel could be working on NPS projects and NPS 
salaried personnel could be working on POM projects. It wasn't feasible for NPS to dedicate 
individual workers to either POM or NPS projects. The POM seemed reluctant to accept this 
explanation but, moved on to other issues in the draft ISA. 
The above meeting was part of a series of regularly scheduled meetings between NPS 
and the POM. Table 4.5 lists the frequency and attendees of the ISA meetings between NPS 
and the POM. The monthly meetings discuss major issues with the ISAs and specific jobs that 
have commanded attention. The bi-weekly meetings discuss specific jobs and other issues 
related to job execution. The last several of the bi-weekly meetings have primarily discussed 
the new draft ISA. The weekly meetings discuss the schedule and performance of specific 
jobs. 
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Table 4.5 NPS/POM ISA Meetings 





Deputy Install. Commander 
Garrison Commander 




Command Sergeant Major 
Deputy Garrison Commander 
Resource Director 
Comptroller 
Director of Public Works 
Asst. Dir. of Public Works 
Budget Technician 
Director of Public Works 
Code 04 Director of Military Ops. 
Code 04A Asst. Dir. of Mil. Ops. 
Code 43 Director Public Works 
Code 04A Asst. Dir. of Mil. Ops. 
Code 43 Director Public Works 
Deputy Code 43 
Asst. Public Works Officer 
Engineering Director 
Shops Director 
Code 43 Director Public Works 
Deputy Code 43 
Asst. Public Works Officer 
Engineering Director 
Maintenance Control Director 
Shops Director 
Head of Production Control 
Source: Interview with NPS Director of Public Works (Code 43), August 17, 1995 
D. TIME STUDY DATA 
Of the four NPS codes requested to do the time study, two responded, Codes 21 and 
43. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 shows the raw data and the linear regression lines to indicate trends. 
Each code took a different approach to the time study. Code 21 started in August and ended 
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Figure 4.4 Code 43*s Time Study Chart 
Code 21's data indicates a decreasing trend in the amount of time devoted to 
ISA/BOS issues. This is most likely due to the abnormally large amount of "end of the fiscal 
year" work to ensure that funding for ISAs that was going to expire was obligated prior to 
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the new fiscal year and the relatively little work following the beginning of the new fiscal year. 
Code 21 probably started the time study before the end of the fiscal year to boost the number 
of hours it would show he was working on BOS/ISA issues. 
Code 43's data indicates an increasing trend in the amount of time devoted to 
BOS/ISA issues. This is probably the result of the work involved in implementing the new 
Public Works POM ISA and his involvement with the implementation of new IS As with other 
agencies. (See Table 4.1). It is apparent Code 43 is spending a considerable amount of his 
time working on BOS/ISA issues. On average, Code 43 is spending 50% of bis day dealing 
with BOS/ISA issues with activities other than NPS. This figure is significant in that Code 43 
stated in the interview data that, before the POM ISAs went into effect, he rarely was 
involved in BOS/ISA issues. In addition, Code 43's data is not influenced by the end of the 
fiscal year obligation requirements as Code 21's was. His study started well after the 
beginning of the new fiscal year. 
Though no time study data was available for Codes 04 and 04A, the interview data 
indicates the same scenario as with Code 43. Prior to the POM ISAs, they spent little time 
on BOS/ISA issues; now large portions of their time are devoted to BOS/ISA issues. Based 
on Code 43's data, it is reasonable to assume Code 04 and 04A's time spent on BOS/ISA 
issues parallels Code 43 s except at a lower levels of time. 
E.        SUMMARY 
From the data, it is clear that NPS' role as a major command on the Monterey 
Peninsula has changed considerably.   The military bases on the Monterey Peninsula have 
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become much more interdependent on one another as a result of the closure of Fort Ord and 
the assumption of BOS for the POM, the POM Annex, and other commands by NPS. NPS 
can no longer consider itself solely an academic institution; in addition, it has also become the 
focal point for BOS for federal, some state, and local agencies. The number and dollar 
amount of ISAs NPS presently administers are some of the largest in DoD. These figures will 
certainly increase as more federal, state, and local agencies occupy Fort Ord facilities. 
NPS compensated for its increased BOS mission by hiring additional Public Works 
and Comptroller personnel to perform the line functions required to support the new ISAs. 
Even though the personnel hired were performing their duties well, confusion and 
coordination problems were becoming evident at upper management levels. From the 
interview data, Code 04 A had the sense of being overwhelmed by the amount of involvement 
he was now having with BOS issues. Codes 04A and 21 expressed concern about the lack 
of coordination between the customer, Code 43, and themselves. 
The observational data pointed out that NPS was having to respond to BOS issues 
from the POM at a much higher level of management than they had to with other BOS 
customers. All levels of Code 04 management were now attending regularly scheduled 
meetings with the POM to discuss BOS issues. This was compounding Code 04A's sense 
of being overwhelmed. 
The time study data supported Code 21 and 43's claim of increased workload since 
the POM ISAs went into effect. Code 21's data showed a decreasing trend of time spent on 
BOS issues and Code 43's data showed and increasing trend.  This divergent outcome, it 
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appears, was primarily due to the heavy end of the fiscal year workload by Code 21. After 
the start of the new fiscal year, Code 21's BOS workload slacked off considerably, which 
caused the downward sloping trend line. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
The approach used in this chapter to analyze the data collected in Chapter IV is similar 
in format to the steps listed in Table 2.3 (Steps in Organizational Problem Analysis). The 
format is a systematic process that assesses the congruence or "fit" among the organizational 
components by analyzing the issues, the environment, the output, and the problems of the 
organization. From the fit analysis, a hypothesis is generated about what is the cause of the 
problems. The last step in this process is to identify possible alternatives to deal with the 
problems. 
A.        ISSUES 
Three issues were identified from the interviews with Codes 04 A, 21, and 43: the 
sense of being overloaded by Code 04 A; unpredictability of tasks by Code 43; and the need 
for better coordination between the NPS codes and between those codes and the POM. 
1. Overload 
Code 04 A's involvement in ISA issues has dramatically increased since the POM IS As 
were established. He doesn't get involved in the day-to-day running of the IS As but, instead, 
is drawn in to put out "fires" concerning BOS for the POM and other activities. Code 43, on 
the other hand, is involved in BOS issues on a daily basis. However, he has not expressed as 
strong a feeling of being overwhelmed but did indicate his time spent working on BOS issues 
has increased considerably since the POM ISAs were established. 
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2. Task Unpredictability 
Prior to the POM ISAs, NPS for the most part dictated the customers BOS 
requirements. The majority of NPS' BOS customers were located on NPS grounds and, as 
such, NPS could integrate their support with its own. It was easy for NPS to predict its 
customers' responses to BOS issues. In fact, very little happened that NPS did not already 
know about. In the new situation, NPS has not been able to dictate the POM's BOS 
requirements. The POM, being a larger, well established command, demands a higher level 
of accountability and management attention on the part of NPS for its business. Thus, NPS 
must react to and process the POM's requirements much more frequently and rapidly than 
it had to with other activities. 
3. Need For Coordination 
When NPS was providing BOS to only tenant commands and a few off-base 
commands, there were minimum dependency problems between NPS departments. Few 
quest, ons or problems arose that could not be handled at lower levels. Codes 04A, 21, and 
43 rarely got involved with ISA issues. When the POM ISAs were established, coordination 
on BOS issues became a major concern of NPS because the POM was driving the issues that 
required a unified response from Codes 04A 21, and 43. ISA issues were now being 
generated by senior Army officers and civilians, and, in response, NPS' senior Navy officers 
and civilians were having to respond in unfamiliar ways. Because of the need to be more 
coordinated and responsive, Codes 04, 21, and 43 suddenly became much more 
interdependent. 
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B.        ENVIRONMENT 
The environment in which NPS provides BOS to its customers has radically changed 
since the closure of Fort Ord. Prior to the closure, NPS provided BOS to its tenant 
commands and a few commands located off-base. All of the commands supported were much 
smaller than NPS and didn't pose a support problem. When Fort Ord closed, BOS functions 
for the POM shifted from Fort Ord to NPS. NPS was now faced with providing support to 
a command that was larger than itself. As a result, NPS BOS for family housing units 
doubled, the building square footage requiring support more than doubled, and the acreage 
nearly doubled. 
The salaries of the public works staff and the comptroller staff who were hired by NPS 
to support the POM ISAs were being paid for by the POM. This provided the POM with a 
large amount of leverage to ensure NPS responded quickly, and at higher management levels, 
than NPS was accustomed to responding. The funding of approximately half of the Public 
Works workforce by the POM placed new demands on NPS to ensure obligations were 
properly charged to the correct accounts. NPS was now having to demonstrate at higher 
levels of management that funds were being properly allocated. This requires additional 
coordination efforts on the part of Codes 04A, 21, and 43. With the other ISAs NPS 
supports, funding issues are usually handled at lower levels of management; and Codes 04A, 
21, and 43 involvement is slight. 
When Fort Ord closed, state, federal, and other DoD activities took up residence in 
the vacated buildings. This has the potential for increasing the ISA workload on NPS. For 
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example, a Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) center moved into the Silas B. 
Hayes hospital building and established an ISA with NPS that is funded at over $700K. This 
was an unexpected ISA that was a direct result of Fort Ord's closure. 
The number and type of activities NPS has the potential to provide some level of BOS 
to is immense and the probability is high that the number of activities for which NPS provides 
BOS will increase in the future. (See Appendix E). With this potential increase, NPS' 
coordination and responsiveness will have to improve in order to maintain control and provide 
support for all its various BOS customers. 
C.       PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
For NPS' BOS/ISA management, effectiveness is difficult to quantify. Effectiveness 
could be measured in terms of customer satisfaction, number of jobs orders completed, time 
managing ISAs, etc. From the data, customer satisfaction did not appear to be a major issue 
with the POM or other commands supported by NPS. BOS job orders increased significantly 
since the POM ISAs went into effect, but the workforce was also increased to compensate 
for the increased work. There is no indication from the data that the percent of job orders 
completed compared to the total number of job orders has changed significantly since the 
POM ISAs went into effect. 
The one area that has changed significantly since the POM ISAs went into effect is 
the amount of time and effort Codes 04/04A and 43 put into managing BOS/ISA issues. 
Prior to the POM ISAs, Codes 04/04A and 43 were basically kept informed of the status of 
BOS/ISA issues. Now they are involved in biweekly and monthly meetings to specifically 
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discuss BOS/ISA issues, and they have reluctantly become the point-of-contact for BOS/ISA 
issues raised by the base and garrison commanders at the POM. 
The significant problem Codes 04/04A 21, and 43 face is the aggregate effect 
numerous IS As are having on their ability to properly manage the ISAs. The codes were able 
to handle the management task prior to the POM ISAs, but after the POM ISAs went into 
effect the management of ISAs suddenly came to the forefront, overshadowing the 
management of NPS itself. 
Another problem the codes face is the growing complexity of managing ISAs over a 
wide variety of organizations. With the potential for more ISAs on the horizon, the 
symptoms of overload, task unpredictability and the lack of coordination will not diminish. 
NPS must be able to adjust the way it manages individual ISAs based on the customer's 
environment. NPS needs to develop a relationship with each of its customers that is 
dependent on the customer's individual needs. To develop this relationship, NPS 
management will have to allocate more time and effort to this process. 
D.        FIT ANALYSIS 
Codes 04/04A and 21 operate as functional organizations. (See Figures 1.1 and 1.2). 
Nearly all accounting functions come under the Comptroller, and base operations under the 
Director of Military Operations. According to Galbraith (1995), there are several advantages 
to this type of organization structure. First, all workers of one type are gathered together 
under one general manager. This allows the workers to transfer ideas and knowledge among 
one another. Second, a greater level of specialization is obtained by dedicating some of the 
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workers to specific jobs, such as BOS, in their functional areas.   Third, fewer pieces of 
expensive equipment would be needed due the concentration of users' ability to share within 
the functional area.   Another advantage of the functional organization structure is the 
standardization and reduced duplication. One system or one policy is adopted for everyone, 
rather than having each department develop its own. 
Galbraith (1995), also points out that the functional organization structure has two 
riajo» weaknesses. First, when an organization expands to provide sevc al different services 
to multiple customers, the variety overwhelms the decision-making capacity of the general 
manager and his functional team. Second, barriers are created between different functions, 
inhibiting cross-functional processes. This weakness becomes apparent when speed and time 
constraints are part of the environment in which the organization operates. 
Thus, a functional organization structure is appropriate for organizations with a small 
stable customer base that requires few services. NPS' BOS environment could have been 
characterized as small and stable prior to Fort Ord's closure and the establishment of the 
POM IS As. Subsequent to Fort Ord's closure, NPS' environment has changed dramatically. 
The IS As developed with the POM are some of the largest IS As in DoD, and IS As with 
organizations moving into Fort Ord buildings have been established or are in the process of 
being established. Because of the changing environment and growth in customers and 
workforce, Code 04's organizational structure no longer provides the best fit for its mission. 
The cause of the issues and problems appears to stem from NPS' underestimation of 
the effect the increasing number of ISAs would have on its ability to manage BOS 
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agreements. From the data, NPS' estimation of the number and type or workers required to 
support the POM ISAs seems to fit the amount of new work generated. However, the effect 
the additional ISAs would have on Codes 04's organization structure were not taken into 
account when the POM ISAs were being established. 
E.        ALTERNATIVES 
The challenge Code 04/04A faces is to coordinate cross-functional work flows among 
themselves, Code 21, and Code 43. To assist Codes 04/04A, linking mechanisms need to be 
established to coordinate the lateral processes across the functional departments. The lateral 
processes can be thought of as the mechanisms for the decentralization of general 
management decisions (Galbraith, 1995). 
The types and amounts of linking mechanisms used will vary with the relative 
importance of environmental factors such as the following: diversity of services performed; 
how rapidly change is occurring in the environment; the degree of interdependence 
required between functional units and the speed with which work needs to be accomplished; 
and the amount of management time and energy that must be invested in the linking 
mechanisms. 
From the data and analysis, NPS is experiencing major increases in three of the four 
environmental factors listed above. The diversity of NPS' BOS services has not radically 
changed from before Fort Ord's closure to the present. Though the amount of BOS services 
has increased considerably, the uniqueness of the service has not increased. BOS for NPS is 
similar to BOS for the POM and the other activities. The other three areas, rapid changes in 
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the customer base, the degree of interdependence among NPS departments, and the speed 
with which work needs to be accomplished has increased since the POM ISAs went into 
effect. 
Using overly complex mechanisms will be too costly and inefficient, while using too 
simple a linking mechanisms will not solve the problem. The choice of linking mechanisms 
should then be based on work-related interdependence. The more complex linking 
requirements require more complex formal linking devises, and the simpler linking 
requirements require simpler linking mechanisms. 
1. Options 
As noted in the literature review, Codes 04, 21 and 43 have several alternative linking 
mechanisms for structural change. (See Table 2.7). The hierarchal structure is the linking 
mechanism that exists at present. However, the data points out that the growth in size and 
scope of their BOS mission has overwhelmed their decision making capacity. For purposes 
of this thesis, the hierarchal structure will not be considered as an option. 
a. Liaison Individuals 
When a considerable amount of contact is necessary to coordinate the work 
of two units, a "liaison" position may be established to route information directly, bypassing 
the vertical channels (Mintsberg, 1983). Liaison individuals are point men of their respective 
departments. They serve as sources of information and expertise for problems and as contacts 
and advisors on issues that affect their departments. The liaison role is usually not a full-time 















Figure 5.1 Liaison Individuals (After Nadler and 
Tushman, 1988) 
b. Cross-Unit Groups 
Cross-Unit groups meet to focus on specific issues, clients, and/or problems. 
The groups can be permanent, temporary or ad hoc. Their objective is to ensure that pertinent 
expertise comes together to deal with their assigned task. Compared with liaison individuals, 
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Figure 5.2 Cross-Unit Groups (After Nadler and 
Tushman, 1988) 
c. Integrator Roles 
Integrators are used to bring the general manager's perspective to the 
functional manager, who in turn focuses the expertise needed to deal with the task/problem. 
While integrators report to senior management, they usually don't posses the authority to 
direct the functional managers. (See Figure 5.3). Because of this lack of authority over the 
functional managers, integrators must rely on their expertise, interpersonal competence, and 
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Figure 5.3 Integrator Role (After Nadler and Tushman, 1988) 
d. Matrix Organization 
Matrix organizations are appropriate when there is an enormous amount of 
information processing requirements. In organizations where the tasks are highly 
interdependent, competing pressures from the functional sides can create a situation beyond 
the structural capability of an integrator to handle. The matrix organization has two chains 
of command in order to handle complex processes, one to deal with the functional side and 
the other to deal with the project side. For example, if the POM IS As require a considerable 
amount of management that draws effort away from all other IS As, the organization could 
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Figure 5.4 Matrix Organization (After Nadler and Tushman, 1988) 
2. Strengths and Weaknesses 
a. Liaison Individuals 
The strengths of liaison individuals are the zero costs involved in establishing 
the liaison and the simplicity of the structure. The liaison individuals pick up the liaison role 
as an additional duty. Because its considered an additional duty, there usually is no additional 
requirement for office space or equipment. Liaison individuals can be thought of as an 
extension of the informal organization that exists in all organizations. 
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One major weakness is the lack of authority to back up any decisions made. 
Liaison individuals are usually lower-level management types who only pass detailed 
information about their specific functions; no one individual has full authority. Additionally, 
no formal arrangements are made between the liaison units to establish lines of authority; and, 
the decision process remains at the functional manager level. This would not alleviate Code 
04A's involvement in BOS/ISA issues. 
b. Cross-Unit Groups 
The major strength of the cross-unit groups is the minimal cost involved in 
establishing the groups. Similar to liaison individuals, groups meet for specific task related 
purposes in addition to their regular functions. Groups provide a more extensive forum for 
information exchange, coordination and conflict resolution than liaison individuals. 
The major weakness of cross-unit groups is the lack of a strong central 
authority or accountable person. Groups are formed from similar levels across functional 
areas to work as a team. The establishment of an authority figure could sway the output of 
the group in favor of the leader's functional area; decision authority usually remains with the 
functional managers. Groups function at levels that normally do not act on major issues 
without higher management involvement. Another possible weakness is that groups can 
become institutionalized and meet on a more permanent basis. In this situation, there can be 
a cost associated with this structure because time spent in groups is time not spent at their 
regular functions. Overtime and/or temporary hires may be required to perform the regular 
functions  of the members of the cross-unit groups when the group's tasks require large 
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amounts of the member's time. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide estimates of 
of the amount of time cross-unit groups would require to solve problems. 
c. Integrator Roles 
A major strength of integrators is that one individual has responsibility for the 
overall project. With this organization structure, responsiveness to issues is ensured. The 
integrator reports to only one individual, thereby developing strong communication channels 
that result in very rapid response times, and the integrator has the ability to integrate among 
the functional disciplines. The integrator also handles all conflicts concerning the project with 
little functional management involvement. 
The major weakness of the integrator role is the cost of maintaining the 
organization structure. Hiring an integrator will require incurring an additional salary 
expense. From the interview data, Codes 21 and 43 indicated the position should be filled by 
a civilian and not a military person. Codes 21's reasoning for having a civilian fill the position 
was to maintain corporate knowledge of the function over longer periods of time than would 
be possible with a military person. Code 43's reasoning was that it would be more difficult 
to obtain an additional military billet due to the current draw down in military personnel. 
Both responses are valid reasons for picking a civilian integrator. 
Discussions with Codes 21 and 43, and the Human Resources Office (HRO) 
on the grade of the integrator indicated a GS-12 would be the appropriate grade based on 
the functions and interaction levels the position would require. Given the position is a GS-12, 
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the cost to NPS for the salary and fringe would be approximately $69,106s. In addition to 
the salary expense, resources such as office space, desks, chairs, computer and printer, filing 
cabinets, telephones, and various administrative supplies will be needed to adequately staff 
the integrator organization structure. Given that only the office space is available at no cost, 
an additional $3,500 to $4,500 would be required to support the new position. It should be 
pointed out that the $3,500-$4,000 is for the most part a one time cost. The availability of 
excess furnishings and equipment could significantly reduce the cost of establishing this 
position. 
One other weakness of the integrator position is the potential lack of job 
stability. If the integrator roll were established for a particular project, when that project was 
completed, there might not be another project waiting. 
d.        Matrix Organization 
According to Przemieniecki (1983), there are several strengths of matrix 
organizations. They allow an organization to meet demands from more than one sector of 
the environment simultaneously. The matrix structure enables the pursuit of technical 
excellence while maintaining strong leadership of the project and keeps the decision authority 
down at a lower level in the organization. It also allows for the flexible use of limited 
resources. As a project's demand for functional specialists changes, there is a ready pool of 
s
 The salary is based on an GS-12 grade at the step five level using rates effective 
January 1995. The salary and fringe cost is computed at 1.43 times the base salary of 
$48,326. Step five was used because it is the middle of the pay scale. Using a lower step 
will reduce the cost of the salary. 
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individuals from which to draw resources or return resources. Related to the first strength, 
the matrix organization also has a great amount of flexibility in meeting changes imposed by 
the external environment. If the project has to start immediately or ends abruptly, it saves the 
hiring and firing that can accompany the purely functional structure. Additionally, there are 
opportunities to foster skill development in both the functional and general management 
areas, which forces management to look more at the big picture in providing training and skill 
development. 
As with the integrator role, the major weaknesses of the matrix organization 
focus on the costs involved in maintaining the organization structure. Matrix organizations 
require dual lines of authority to handle the enormous and complex processes that result from 
the size and number of IS As. 
In a matrix organization, the program manager has directing responsibilities 
over functional types that the integrator does not. Because of these directing responsibilities, 
the program manager's grade level should be equal to or greater than the grade level of his 
functional manager counterparts. As such, the ISA Program Manager's grade level should 
be at the GS-13 level. Having a program manager with a lower grade level, like the 
integrators', will cause a power imbalance between the ISA Program Manager and the 
functional managers. This will reduce the effectiveness of the program manager's dealings 
with the functional departments. 
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Assuming a grade level of GS-13 the cost to NPS for the salary will be 
approximately $82,1769. In addition to the salary expense, like the integrator, the program 
manager will need office space, desks, chairs, computer and printer, filing cabinets, 
telephones, and various administrative supplies. The cost of these items, $3,500 to $4,500 
is the same as it would be for the integrator. Also, this cost would be a one time cost and the 
availability of excess furnishings and equipment could significantly reduce this cost further. 
Other weaknesses are the conflict and confusion that may accompany a dual 
authority system. Managers in the functional department who are involved in a project that 
has a project manager have to report to two bosses- the functional boss and the project 
manager. The amount of time necessary in coordinating meetings between project and the 
function personnel grows with the complexity of the project. With the increased management 
oversight, employees become confused when they receive conflicting direction from the two 
managers. Because of the complex structure of the matrix, employees need training on 
handling and resolving conflicts. Maintaining the power balance between the project and 
functional areas is also a challenge. Depending on the Superintendent's preferences, the 
balance of power between the project and functional managers can be difficult to maintain. 
9
 The salary is based on an GS-13 grade at the step five level using rates effective 
January 1995. The salary and fringe cost is computed at 1.43 times the base salary of 
$57,466. Step five was used because it is the middle of the pay scale. Using a lower step 
will reduce the cost of the salary. 
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e. Summary 
In Chapter VI the strengths and weaknesses of each of the options listed above 
will be evaluated to formulate a recommendation to Code 04 on what the best organization 
structure is for managing BOS/ISA issues. Table 5.1 summarizes the strengths and 
weaknesses of each option. 
Table 5.1 Summary of Structural Option's Strengths and Weaknesses 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Liaison - Zero cost. - No authority to backup decisions. 
Individuals - Simple to establish - No one person is accountable. 
- Decision authority remains with 
functional managers. 
- Limited information exchange 
capacity. 
Cross-Unit - minimal cost. - No strong central authority. 
Groups - broader information - No one person is accountable. 
exchange than liaison - Decision authority remains with 
individuals. functional managers. 
Integrator - Responsiveness to issues. - More costly than the previous 
Roies - Rapid reaction time. options. Yearly salary of 
- Integrated facilities between $69,106 and a start up cost of 
functions. $3,500 to $4,500. 
- Ill-defined career progression. 
Matrix - Manages dual environment - Most costly option. Yearly salary of 
Organization demand. $82,176 and a start up cost of 
- Flexible use of limited $3,500 to $4,500. 
resources. - Conflict and confusion. 
- Adaptability to - Time consuming. 
environmental - Special training required. 
changes. - Difficult to maintain power balance. 
- Fosters skill development 
and training. 
Source: Przemieniecki, 1993 
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VL SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSIONS 
A.        SUMMARY 
Subsequent to the closure of Fort Ord, NPS' workforce rapidly expanded to assume 
the POM's BOS functions that Fort Ord previously provided. The rapid expansion in 
workforce, coupled with NPS having the POM (a command larger than NPS) as a customer, 
created new and different management requirements for Codes 04/04A 21, and 43. Feelings 
of being overloaded were expressed by Codes 04A and 43, the two directors most heavily 
involved with POM BOS. In addition to their normal managerial tasks, these codes were now 
having to spending large amounts of their time managing the POM's BOS. Coordination 
among the codes in response to BOS issues became a problem as dealings with the POM were 
happening at the highest levels of management. BOS issues with other activities with which 
NPS had IS As rarely required Codes 04/04 A's involvement. Now, regularly scheduled 
monthly meetings with the POM on BOS issues required the attendance of Code 04, 04A and 
43. This created a stronger need for interdependence than the codes were accustomed to. 
At Fort Ord, vacated buildings were beginning to be occupied by various federal, state 
and local agencies. The number of agencies moving into Fort Ord facilities continues to 
increase as more facilities are turned over from the Army. The potential exists for the number 
of ISAs NPS manages to increase considerably in the future. The environment NPS is 
operating in is one of expanding BOS responsibility with an uncertain leveling-off point. 
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As the aggregate number of ISAs NPS manages increases to include many different 
types agencies, the scope and variety of services provided will increase as well. This will 
compound the complexity of managing the services provided, as well as tracking the costs and 
funds available for individual ISA jobs. 
Based on the data and the analysis, the Code 04 organization has experienced a shift 
in its environment. The catalyst for the shift was the establishment of the ISAs with the POM 
subsequent to Fort Ord's closure. NPS adjusted its workforce to compensate for the 
increased mission, but it underestimated the effect the growth would have on upper 
management's involvement with the POM ISAs. The established interdependence between 
Codes 04/04A 21, and 43 was no longer sufficient for the demands the POM was placing on 
NPS. Codes 04A and 43 became overloaded with the volume and complexity of BOS 
management decisions they were facing. 
The organizational structure no longer provided the best fit between the codes 
internally or with their BOS customers. What Codes 04A and 43 need is a structure that is 
capable of making BOS management decisions at a lower level than what is presently 
happening. The structure also needs to be able to facilitate coordination between Codes 21, 
43, and the customer. 
B.        RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Structure 
Chapter V discussed several options for the type of structure that would be suited for 
Code  04's organization.  Based on the complexity and continuing growth in NPS' BOS 
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functions, Code 04's best option is to establish an integrator (referred to as an ISA Manager 
from here on) that reports to Code 04. Figure 6.1 is a representation of what the 

































































Facilities Support Contracts 
Figure 6.1 Recommended Structure (Interviews with Codes 21, 04A, and 43 by author on 
various dates) 
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The solid line from Code 04A to the ISA Manager represents the line of authority. 
The ISA Manager will be part of Code 04's organization. The placement of the ISA Manager 
in Code 04's organization does not fit the standard integrator structure as depicted in Figure 
5.3.     In a more standard arrangement, the ISA Manager would come under the 
Superintendent.  Howeve;  the ISA Manager is placed in Code 04's organization because 
Code 04 functions in the same capacity as a base commander who is responsible for all 
aspects of base operations, including BOS provided to other commands.   The Code 04 
organization is the point-of-contact for other departments and other commands when they 
have issues concerning military operations. From a functional alignment stand point, it makes 
better sense to place the ISA Manager under Code 04. The dotted lines in Figure 6.1 
represent the linking mechanisms the ISA Manager needs to establish to coordinate ISA 
functions   The lines shown are recommended as a result of discussions between the author 
and Codes 21 and 43.  The areas where the lines are connected represent the most direct 
paths the ISA Manager has for gathering ISA information. However, the dotted lines are only 
an initial estimate of where the ISA Manager needs to concentrate his or her coordination 
efforts. As the ISA Manager settles into position, other lines of communication are certain 
to develop at various levels of complexity. 
Not shown in Figure 6.1 is the link the ISA Manager has to the ISA customers. The 
ISA manager will also need to establish communication links with all of NPS' ISA customers. 
The complexity of the links will be determined in large part by the ISA. Because a customer 
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has a large reimbursable cost doesn't necessarily mean the ISA Manager will need to spend 
a great deal of time with it. The type of BOS provided and the environment the customer 
operates in will be the largest determinants of effort required by the ISA Manager. Customers 
who have relatively routine BOS requirements and a stable environment will probably require 
less effort to manage than customers whose BOS requirements are unpredictable. If the 
customer's environment is rapidly changing, this can also increase the effort required by the 
ISA Manager due to the potential for task unpredictability and need for quick responses to 
fluctuating requirements. 
It should be noted that the integrator role can not operate as the only type of 
communication link between Codes 21, 43, and the customer. The informal organization 
structure that exists between Codes 21, 43, and the customer needs to continue to exist. 
a. Strengths 
The ISA Manager enables decisions to be made at lower levels, thus reducing 
the management decision requirements of Codes 04A and 43. Another strength is that the 
ISA Manager is at the crossroads of several information streams. For example, what might 
appear to be interesting information but worthless to Code 43 may be a valuable piece of 
information to the comptroller staff. This enables the ISA manager to act like a nerve center 
for ISA issues. By identifying these situations and following through with them, the ISA 
Manager performs useful functions for the departments. Another advantage of the ISA 
Manager performing like a nerve center is the improvement in coordination between Codes 
04A21, and 43. 
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The other options, such as liaison individuals and cross-unit teams, don't 
provide full-time attention to ISA issues nor do they reduce upper management's decision 
making involvement. From the data and analysis, it is apparent that the growth in the number 
and size of IS As NPS manages requires full-time attention to manage effectively. Another 
reason for not choosing these options is that no one individual is accountable or a point-of- 
contact for ISA issues. Problems or differences that arise between departments can result in 
a breakdown in information processing and lead to costly delays in processing work. 
The matrix organization structure is too complex and some what more costly 
(GS-13 instead of a GS-12) for NPS to consider at this point in time. Using a matrix 
organization structure would require the ISA Manager position to be under the 
Superintendent vice being under Code 04, as the integrator would be. (See Figure 5.4). The 
ISA Manager in a matrix organization would have authority over functional personnel in both 
Codes 21 and 43. Having the ISA Manager under Code 04 and directing personnel in Code 
21 would create undue influence by Code 04 on Code 21's operations. However, if NPS 
continues to become the focal point on the Monterey Peninsula for government agencies to 
draw support from, there could be a time when the matrix structure would be the better 
choice. 
b. Weaknesses 
Since Code 04 has no direct authority over the Comptroller, the ISA Manager 
has no power base with respect to the Comptroller. This could create tensions between Code 
04 and the Comptroller if the ISA Manager makes decisions that the Comptroller feels are not 
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in his department's best interest. Though this is a potential weakness, it should be pointed 
out that the interview and observational data did not reveal any serious problems in this area. 
Another weakness of the ISA Manager function is that it is dependent more 
on a healthy informal organization. As the linking mechanisms become more complex, they 
actually build on organization conflict (Nadler and Tushman, 1988). The informal 
organization needs to be able to handle ambiguity and conflict that is associated with more 
complex linking mechanisms. 
The most pertinent weakness of the ISA Manager structure is its cost. Adding 
an ISA Manager requires the hiring of an individual, establishment of office space, and the use 
of office equipment. The cost of office space and equipment can be relatively insignificant, 
assuming no cost for the office space and the availability of excess equipment. The salary on 
the other hand is significant. 
Given the position is a GS-12, the cost to NPS for the salary and fringe would 
be approximately $69,106. As discussed earlier, one of the major weaknesses of the 
integrator structure is the cost. NPS has a couple of options from which it can choose to fund 
this position. The options are that NPS can pay for 100% of the salary or NPS could develop 
a cost reimbursement schedule for the activities NPS has ISAs with. A recommendation 
would be to use Figure 4. l's reimbursable dollar percentages as a base for assigning the ISA 
Manager's salary costs to each of the ISA customers. Table 6.1 illustrates the cost schedule. 
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Table 6.1 Reimbursable Cost Schedule 
Commands Percentage Salary & Fringe Reimbursable 
Cost 
POM 58.50% $69,106 $40,427 
DMDC 17.20% $69,106 $11,886 
DRMI 11.80% $69,106 $8,155 
FNOC 5.90% $69,106 $4,077 
DFAS 2.90% $69,106 $2,004 
Others 3.70% $69,106 $2,557 
Total 100.00% $69,106 
Since the "Others" percentage of the table is made up of many commands with 
small ISAs, NPS could assume their costs. Another recommendation would be for NPS to 
fund 50% of the salary and the remaining 50% by the ISA customers. The number of ways 
NPS could be reimbursed for the salary cost is endless. But NPS must be able to justify in 
quantifiable terms the reasoning behind the schedule chosen. An argument can be made that 
the commands NPS has ISAs with should share in the cost of the ISA Manager's position. 
After all, the ISA Manager is there to coordinate all aspects of the ISA, which is in the best 
interests of NPS and its ISA customers. 
2. ISA Manager Functions 
Galbraith (1973) said the integrator's function is not to make the best decision but to 
see that the best decision gets made. NPS' ISA Manager needs to do both. One of the 
primary functions of the ISA Manager will be to assume the majority of ISA management 
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decisions from Codes 04A and 43. Specifically, the Manager should be responsible for 
preparing IS As using information provided by Code 43 and 21, coordinating negotiations and 
approvals, and administering their execution, review and eventual termination if appropriate. 
As such, the ISA manager needs to be knowledgeable about public works and comptroller 
functions. The ISA Manager must have a good working knowledge of the capabilities of the 
Public Works Department. He or She must have an understanding of what constitutes a minor 
and specific job order, and be familiar with direct and indirect costs pools. To be effective, 
he or she must be able to listen to Public Works issues and restate them in "comptroller talk" 
and vice versa. 
The ISA Manager's effectiveness is a function of how much influence he or she has 
over the functional areas. If functional personnel do not work for the ISA manager, how does 
he or she exercise influence? Having expert knowledge on comptroller and public works 
issues is one way of providing the ISA Manager with considerable influence. However, when 
the goals and objectives of Codes 04 and 21 diverge, expert knowledge is of little use. The 
ISA Manager must be able to influence the functional codes regardless of circumstances. 
Codes 04 and 21 can increase the ISA Manager's influence by increasing the 
manager's formal position power. Galbraith (1973) describes three processes that can 
increase the integrator's position power. The first process is to ensure the ISA Manager is 
put into the decision making process. For example, when budgets are being prepared, the 
ISA Manager could have a chop on the budget areas that affect ISA/BOS issues. He or she 
might be in the position to suggest some interdepartmental tradeoffs which can not be seen 
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from the Code 04/21 perspective. The second process would be to ensure the ISA Manager 
is in the planning process. The earlier the ISA Manager enters into the planning process the 
greater the influence he or she will have on the final outcome. It will allow the manager to 
initiate tasks and/or changes more easily if the planning process begins with him or her. 
Finally, if considerable position power is needed, the ISA Manager could be given control of 
the budgets involved with BOS/ISA issues. Funding would flow through the ISA Manager 
into the departments  In effect, the ISA Manager would buy resources from the departments. 
It should be stressed that the three processes listed above are designed to empower 
the ISA Manager. If the relationship the ISA Manager has with Codes 21 and 43 does not 
indicate additional empowerment is required, these processes do not to be implemented. 
However, if Code 04 feels they are necessary, he will have to negotiate with Code 21 to 
determine the amount of position power the ISA Manager should have. 
C.        CONCLUSIONS 
The primary research question this thesis addressed was how Code 04's organisation 
should be restructured to better manage BOS for the POM and other supported activities. 
The secondary research questions dealt with how restructuring would affect available 
resources and how much would it cost. 
To answer the research questions, a literature review and research data were used as 
a basis to analyze several restructuring alternatives. The strengths and weaknesses of each 
alternative were compared and analyzed to determine what alternative would be the best fit 
for Code 04's organization at the present time.    From the data and analysis, it was 
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recommended that Code 04's organization develop an ISA Manager position under Code 
04A. (See Figure 6.1). The ISA Manager would function as an integrator for accounting and 
public works issues that relate to NPS' IS As. The ISA Manager position, as recommended, 
would not have authority over accounting and public works functional personnel but, instead, 
would coordinate their efforts in order to make the best decisions possible. 
The resources needed to fund the ISA Manager position were (1) a salary based on 
a GS-12 grade at the step five level and (2) office space and equipment needed to establish 
the new position. To mitigate the cost of the salary, a reimbursable cost schedule was 
developed that would distribute the cost of the ISA Manager's salary across the commands 
NPS had ISAs with. To reduce the cost of establishing the office, excess space and 
equipment could be obtained from sources within NPS. Depending on how NPS distributes 
the cost of the salary and the availability of excess equipment, the cost to NPS for the 
restructure could range from minimal to full cost. 
This thesis presented Code 04 with recommendations to solve organizational structure 
problems that evolved from the closure of Fort Ord. The recommendations take into account 
the varying degrees of interdependencies that exist between the codes and between the codes 
and BOS customers. Cost was also a factor in determining the right structure for Code 04. 
Implementing the ISA Manager position will reduce Codes 04A and 43's level of 
involvement with ISA issues - thus easing the overload conditions described in the interview 
data. Improvement in coordination is another outcome from implementing the ISA Manager 
position. 
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The ISA Manager will be at the crossroads of information flows that will aid Code 04 in ■*e> 
making the right decisions at the right time. 
D.   OTHER AREAS OF POSSIBLE RESEARCH 
An area that has not been addressed is the possibility of having the POM's BOS be 
provided by commercial activities rather than NPS. The 1993 BRAC Commission 
recommended looking at either NPS or commercial activities to provide the POM with BOS. 
Reviewing the possibility of having commercial activities provide the BOS has been set aside. 
The research question would focus on determining if all or part of the POM's BOS could be 
performed by commercial activities at a lower cost than NPS can provide the BOS. 
Another area of research would be to analyze Code 04's organization to determine if 
a requirement exists for some level of centralized budget control within Code 04. Responses 
to interview questions about problem areas indicated budget control within Code 04 was an 
issue. Presently, Code 04A himself is coordinating the budgets of Code 04's 11 departments. 
Perhaps Code 04A needs some assistance with his budget effort. 
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF ACRONYMS 
BOS     Base Operations Support 
BRAC   Base Realignment and Closure Commission 
BRDENTAL Branch Dental Clinic 
CSUMB    California State University at Monterey Bay 
DFAS  Defense Finance and Accounting Center 
DHRSC Defense Health Resources Study Center 
DIS  Defense Investigative Service 
DLI Defense Language Institute 
DMDC  Defense Manpower Data Center 
DRMI Defense Resource Management Institute 
FLENUMMETOCCEN Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center 
ISA  Interservice Support Agreement 
NCIS Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
NOAA   National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NRL Naval Research Laboratory 
NAVSECGRUDET   Naval Security Group Detachment 
NPS   Naval Postgraduate School 
OPN Other Procurement, Navy 
PERSERREC  Defense Personnel Security Research Center 
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POM Presidio of Monterey 
PSD     Personnel Support Activity Detachment 
ROICC  Resident Officer In Charge of Construction 
TRADOC  Training and Doctrine Analysis Command 
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APPENDIX B: TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
Commercial Activities Study (CA). CA researches the possibility of commercial 
businesses assuming the activities presently performed by federal government agencies. 
Director of Military Operations (Code 04) Basic Functions. Functions in the same 
capacity as a naval station commander in the direction of commanding military operations, 
the management of the command "physical plant," and the provision of all non-academic 
services and support to the command. These services include administration, military 
personnel services, security, public affairs, moral welfare and recreation, BOQ/BEQ, 
supply, communications, fire protection, public works, chaplain services, the 
Commissioned Officers' of the Faculty Club, and the Family Service Center 
(NAVPGSCOLINST 5400.2C). 
Interservice Support Agreement (ISA). Support provided by one DoD activity to a 
DoD activity of another Military Service or Reserve Component, Defense Agency, Unified 
Combatant Command, Air National Guard, or Field Activity. 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). Memorandums that define general areas of 
conditional agreement between two or more parties - -what one party does depends on 
what the other party does (e.g., one party agrees to provide support if the other party 
reimburses for the support). MO As that establish responsibilities for providing recurring 
reimbursable support should be supplemented with support agreements that define the 
support, basis for reimbursement, and the billing/payment process. 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Memorandums that define general areas of 
understanding between two or more parties. - the MOU explains -what each party plans to 
do, however, what each party does is not dependent on what the other party does (e.g., 
does not require reimbursement or other support from receiver). 
Tenant Command. A command located on or near another command's base from which 
the tenant command receives base operations support. 
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APPENDIX C: SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Describe what you feel are the major problem/s with managing the ISAs and how would you 
fix the problem/s? 
This question was asked to get an understanding of what the managers felt 
were the problems and their interpretation of a solution. 
What determines ifNPS will enter into an ISA with another command? 
This question was asked to get an understanding of the criteria NPS uses in 
deciding to enter into an ISA Agreement. 
How many ISAs are there? Does NPS have ISAs with all its tenant commands? 
These questions were asked to determine the size of the potential problem 
with managing the ISAs. 
Describe the process of developing an ISA from its inception until it is signed by both 
parties? 
This question was asked in order to get an understanding of the ISA process. 
Describe how funding is requested, received, and obligated/expended for ISAs? 
This question was asked in order to get an understanding of the flow of funds 
for ISAs. 
What other Codes in your department or in other departments do you interface with on ISA 
issues? 
This question was asked to determine the independencies between divisions 
and departments. It also provides insight into informal organizational 
relationships. 
What ISAs do you spend the majority of your time (resources) working on? Do these ISAs 
take away from other less demanding ISAs or other duties in general? 
These questions were asked to gauge the extent certain ISAs 
monopolize a manager's time. 
For what purpose and how many meetings do you attend with other commands concerning 
ISAs? Who are the other commands? 
The purpose of these questions is to determine to what extent NPS is 
spending time with on ISA matters with other commands. 
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Why did NFS enter into an ISA with the POM? 
This question was asked to understand the background behind the ISA with 
the POM. 
What changes did you make in your department as a result of the ISA with the POM? 
This question was asked to determine the effect the ISA with the POM had 
on Codes 04 and 02. 
As a customer, what problem do you see with NPS' management oflSAs? 
This question was asked to gauge how a customer of NPS views management 
oflSAs. 
As a customer, what changes would you like to see implemented by NPS to improve 
management of your ISA? 
This question was asked to determine what NPS' customers thought about 
improving the management process. 
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APPENDIX D: TIME STUDY WORKSHEET 
Below is the cover memo that accompanied the time study work sheet. The memo 
includes the criteria the participants used to account for their time spent working on ISA/BOS 
issues. The following page contains the sample work sheet. 
MEMORANDUM 
From: LCDR Mark Bower 
To:      Distribution 
Subj:    TIME STUDY FOR WORK PERFORMED ON ISA/BOS 
Encl:    (1) Time study worksheet 
1. As part of my thesis I request the below personnel document the amount of time they 
spend working on Interservice Support Agreements and/or Base Operating Support 
topics. 
2. The purpose of this time study is to determine how much time management is spending 
working on ISA/BOS issues. 
Guidelines: 
1. Start tracking time on October 12; finish on November 17. 
2. Do not count every minute of every day, but instead, a good feel for the 
percentage of the workday (8 hours) you spent on ISA/BOS issues. 
Include weekends if applicable. 
3. 8 hours = 100%; 4 hours = 50%; 2 hours = 25%, etc. 
4. Place an "X" in the appropriate box on enclosure (1) . Any ISA/BOS work 
should equal at least 5%. An example would be, if for the whole day you 
spent 5 minutes on ISA/BOS issues, put an "X" in the 5% block. 
5. Do not count BOS work for NPS as part of this study. 
6. Do not count discussions/interviews with me as part of this study. 
7. Do count all other time, such as, thinking, talking, writing, meetings, etc about 
ISA/BOS Issues. 




APPENDIX E: TENANTS AT (OLD) FORT ORD 
* CITY OF DEL REY OAKS 
* CALIFORNIA STATE PARKS 
* MONTEREY INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH AND ASTRONOMY 
* FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
* CITY OF MARINA 
* MONTEREY PENINSULA UNITED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
* MCKINNEY ACT PROVIDERS 
* CITY OF SEASIDE 
* LAGUNA SEC A RACING ASSOCIATION 
* GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY 
124TH U.S. ARMY RESERVE CENTER 
902D MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY 
AMERICAN RED CROSS 
ARMY EMERGENCY RELIEF 
ARMY CAREER AND ALUMNI PROGRAM 
ARMY MATERIAL COMMAND 
ARMY AIR FORCE EXCHANGE SERVICE 
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 
CALIFORNIA MEDICAL DETACHMENT 
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY MONTEREY BAY 
CENTRAL COAST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION 
CHILDREN'S SERVICES INTERNATIONAL 
COASTSIDE CABLE TV. 
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COUNTY OPPORTUNITY CENTER 
DEFENSE REUTILIZATION AND MARKETING OFFICE 
DEFENSE PRINTING OFFICE 
DEFENSE COMMISSARY AGENCY 
DEFENSE DATA MANPOWER CENTER 
DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE 
DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS 
EMPIRE WEST COMPANIES (THORSON VILLAGE) 
FORT ORD REUSE AUTHORITY (FORA) 
GIRL AND BOY SCOUTS 
MARINA EQUESTRIAN ASSOCIATION 
RECRUIT OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS (3RD BDE) 
ROEDER INC. ORGANIZATION (BROSTROM PARK) 
SACRAMENTO DISTRICT CORPS OF ENGINEERS 
SCHEDULED AIRLINES TICKET OFFICE 
STATE EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT 
THRIFT SHOP 
U. S. ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS COMMAND 
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE 
U .S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ 
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION MEDICAL CLINIC 
YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION 
* - SERVICE SUPPORT AGREEMENTS LIKELY 
Source: BRAC update presentation to Admiral Mercer, February 10, 1995 
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